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I. INTRODUCTION
The United States Supreme Court's highly controversial decision of
Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council' promulgated a flood of litera-
ture concerning the bounds of state police power under the Fifth 2 and
Fourteenth3 Amendments. Although the decision may only apply in the
"relatively rare situations" when a landowner is deprived of all economi-
cally viable land uses,4 scholars have had a field day scrutinizing the
basis and effect of the decision. The criticism of the decision, however,
began long before the flood of literature. When the Court released the
Lucas decision, it contained two vehement dissents, by Justices Black-
mun and Stevens. The fulcrum of the Lucas critique is the newly pro-
nounced categorical takings rule and the drastic changes it brings to a
previously established framework. This Note focuses not on the overall
disposition of the case, but rather on the controversy that surrounds the
framework utilized by the Court in Lucas.
The instrumental factors in the Lucas dispute are a South Carolina
1. 112 S. Ct. 2886 (1992).
2. The Fifth Amendment's Takings clause reads, "nor shall private property be taken for
public use, without just compensation." U.S. CONST. amend. V.
3. "The guarantee that private property shall not be taken for public use without just
compensation is applicable to the States through the Fourteenth Amendment." Penn Central
Transp. Co. v. City of New York, 438 U.S. 104, 142 n.3 (1978) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
4. Lucas, 112 S. Ct. at 2894.
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coastal preservation act' and a landowner who owned two parcels of
beachfront property. The implications of the controversy, however,
spread far beyond the confines of the parties at issue.
David Lucas purchased two beachfront lots on the Isle of Palms,
South Carolina, in 1986.6 At the time of his purchase, there were no
existing land-use restrictions that would have prohibited development on
Lucas' property.7 His intention was to build single-family homes upon
each of the plots.8 Subsequent to Lucas' purchase, but prior to the
development of his land, South Carolina enacted the Beachfront Man-
agement Act ("the Act"). 9 The Act effectively prohibited David Lucas
from erecting any habitable structures on his property, although certain
nonhabitable uses would have been allowed.' 0 Furthermore, the Act's
language was absolute and provided for no exceptions.1 '
David Lucas filed suit in the South Carolina Court of Common
Pleas alleging that as a result of the severe restrictions placed on his land
by the Act, he had suffered a Fifth Amendment taking. 2 The trial court
agreed and found that Lucas' lots were left with no economically viable
use. 13 Accordingly, the trial court awarded David Lucas $1,232,387.50
as just compensation for the taking.' 4
On appeal, the South Carolina Supreme Court reversed.' 5 The
South Carolina court determined that the Act was necessary to protect
the health, safety, and welfare of the state. The court based its decision
on the line of cases that followed Mugler v. Kansas16 and the resulting
"noxious use" doctrine.17 That doctrine provided that a state may enact
legislation that prohibits nuisance-like activity, or activities akin to nui-
sance, and resist the payment of compensation to landowners under their
inherent police powers.' 8
The United States Supreme Court granted certiorari and heard oral
argument on March 2, 1992. On June 29, 1992, the final day of the
5. S.C. Code § 48-39-10 et. seq. (1987).




10. Id. at 2889-90 n.2.





16. 123 U.S. 623 (1887).
17. Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council, 404 S.E.2d 895, 901-02 (S.C. 1991), rev'd on
other grounds, 112 S. Ct. 2886 (1992) (holding that the Mugler rule is designed to prevent serious
public harm and is applicable to the facts at hand).
18. Id. at 900.
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term, the Court released its Lucas decision. Five different Justices wrote
opinions in the case that was decided 6-3 in favor of the private land-
owner, David Lucas. Writing for the majority, Justice Scalia refused to
follow the Mugler noxious use analysis. Instead, he pronounced a new
categorical takings rule to be used whenever a landowner is denied all
economically viable land uses as a result of a severe land regulation. 19
The rule states that unless there were prior restrictions placed on the
land, such as restrictions under state nuisance or property law, a land
restriction of such an extreme consequence constituted a per se violation
of the Fifth Amendment.2 ° If such a total taking was found, states could
no longer justify uncompensated land regulation by purporting to pro-
hibit nuisance-like activity. Courts must instead inquire into back-
ground nuisance law to determine if the regulation seeks to avoid an
actual nuisance, or inquire into background property law to see if the
limitations inhered in the landowners title.2
Under Lucas' categorical analysis, the Court declared that it would
obviate any "case-specific inquiry" into the nature of the state's regula-
tion.22 This aspect of the newly pronounced test is significant because
all prior takings decisions had considered the legitimacy of the state
action and had generally deferred to legislative judgments. The great
deference afforded state lawmakers helped enhance a broad concept of
state police power to regulate land without providing compensation. At
present, however, state legislative decisions receive no deference what-
soever when courts use the categorical rule. Accordingly, Lucas effec-
tively ignores the statute at issue and places an extreme limitation on
legislative power to enact strict environmental plans, such as the South
Carolina act.
Moreover, Lucas renders the statutory process a non-factor in
deciding some important land-use controversies. As a result of this facet
of Lucas, environmental advocates and environmental interest groups
that formerly played a key role in legislative land-use policy-making are
also rendered non-factors under this test. Since Lucas presents a change
in takings law that apparently favors private landowners,23 this Note
takes a devil's advocate position and analyzes situations and strategies
that can avoid or nullify the decision's effects. Accordingly, this Note
depicts the critical elements of Lucas that environmental advocates
should attack.
19. Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council, 112 S. Ct. 2886, 2893-2900 (1992).
20. Id. at 2900-01.
21. Id. at 2900.
22. Id. at 2893.
23. Joseph L. Sax, Rights that "Inhere in the Title Itself": The Impact of the Lucas Case on
Western Water Law, 26 Loy. L.A. L. REv. 943 (1993).
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Part II of this Note analyzes takings law as it existed pre-Lucas and
highlights the relevant aspects of the doctrine that have since changed.
Part II further analyzes the opinion itself and pinpoints a critical flaw in
the Court's analysis-failure to resolve the issue of defining the prop-
erty unit. Part III focuses on the cost-benefit analysis that is significant
in protecting the environment through land regulation. Part IV focuses
on one suggestion to environmental advocates who, in the wake of
Lucas, are litigating claims that achieve the very goals that restrictive
legislation would have accomplished. Due to justiciability concerns,
funding, and difficulty in naming suits with broad reaching conse-
quences, however, this suggestion would not presently meet with the
most success. Part V focuses on lobbying strategies that will help
undermine Lucas' impact on environmental legislation. The essence of
this section is to broaden state conceptions of nuisance law to maximize
the utility of Lucas' lone exception. Finally, Part VI analyzes the most
effective way to combat Lucas-utilizing lobbying activity to promul-
gate expansive legislation that regulates, while providing landowners
with an administrative option. Under this option, landowners can avoid
costly takings litigation and receive transferable development rights
(TDRs) to ensure that they maintain an economically viable use for their
property. In turn, Lucas is rendered inapplicable, and courts can once
again utilize a balancing approach to decide regulatory takings cases. If
that is achieved, courts will once again defer to legislative judgments
and provide environmental advocates a chance to help shape land-use
policy via restrictive land regulation.
II. THE TAKINGS DOCTRINE AND LUc.4s: REDEFINING THE OUTER
BOUNDARIES OF STATE POLICE POWER
The Supreme Court's takings decisions have unfortunately created
a spectrum in which the precise boundaries of a state's police power are
uncertain.24 Recent changes in the Court's Fifth Amendment takings
analysis have cut back on broad state police power in favor of enhanced
protection of private property rights.25 These changes began when the
24. Penn Central Transp. Co. v. City of New York, 438 U.S. 104, 124 (1978) (Brennan, J.,
plurality opinion); The Supreme Court, 1991 Term-Leading Cases, 106 HARv. L. Rv. 269, 269-
70 (1992); Laurie G. Ballenger, Note, A House Built on Sand. Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal
Council, 71 N.C. L. Rv. 928 (1993).
25. Jeremy Paul, Scalia's Pursuit Of Holy Grail Has Its Price, N.J.L.J., Aug. 3, 1992, at 15
(arguing that Lucas resulted in the anticipated shift in the constitutional balance since the Court
decided in favor of the landowner); John M. Payne, From the Courts-Takings and
Environmental Regulations, 21 REAL EsT. L.J. 312, 319 (1993) (arguing that the new takings
inquiry favors state compensation of takings claimants); Daniel J. Popeo & Paul D. Kamenar, The
Tide Has Finally Turned In Favor of Property Rights, N.J.L.J., Aug. 3, 1992, at 15 (arguing that
the new takings rule effectuates judicial protection of private property rights).
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Court decided Nollan v. California Coastal Commission26  and
culminated with the disposition of Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal
Council.27 The two opinions, both authored by Justice Antonin Scalia,
apparently have turned the tide in favor of protecting private land inter-
ests over state regulatory interests. As is often the case, however, Amer-
ican law evolves as our society's needs and standards change. 2
8
Therefore, some changes in the law will prove to be necessary responses
to changing conditions. Due to this adaptability in American legal con-
structions, it is essential to focus on the historical development of mod-
em takings law in order to comprehend the technical innovations that
Lucas brings to takings law. Accordingly, this section critically ana-
lyzes the prior standards and legal constructions used by the Court in
Fifth Amendment cases prior to Lucas. Specifically, this section high-
lights the balancing of interests test and the deferential standard of
reviewing legislative judgments to regulate land.
A. Balancing the Interests: A Balance Weighted in Favor of
the State
The Court's early takings decisions emphasized that state govern-
ments must be able to regulate land without providing compensation for
every change in state land-use law.29 The early rule protected a state's
ability to prohibit harmful, noxious, or nuisance-like activity within its
borders.30 So long as the regulation purported to reach one of these
aims, it was found constitutional as an exercise of a state's police power.
The justification for such a rule is simple: it is an inherent power of the
state to regulate in a manner that promotes the health, safety, or welfare
of its citizens. States are free to regulate under this implied "police
power" as long as the power is not used arbitrarily, unreasonably, or
capriciously.
3 1
Over time, the boundary of state police power changed. Instead of
relying on noxious use language, the Court enumerated a requirement
that examined the overall legitimacy of the state action. The oft-stated
principle was that in order to be valid, a state regulation "must advance a
legitimate state interest."' 32 This rule was applied liberally by the modern
26. 483 U.S. 825 (1987) (holding that the state cannot condition the issuance of a building
permit on the landowner's agreement to allow public access across his property).
27. 112 S. Ct. 2886 (1992).
28. Paul, supra note 25. See also Lucas, 112 S. Ct. at 2922 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
29. Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393, 413 (1922).
30. Lucas, 112 S. Ct. at 2897. See also Mugler v. Kansas, 123 U.S. 623, 668-69 (1887)
(holding that states can regulate uses that are "injurious to the health, morals, or safety of the
community" and resist compensating landowners for such regulation).
31. 29A C.J.S. Eminent Domain § 8 (1992).
32. E.g., Agins v. Tiburon, 447 U.S. 255, 260 (1980).
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Court. As a result, the Court recognized a broad concept of "legitimate
state interest" and made it relatively easy for states to justify land-use
restrictions as valid exercises of police power.33 Relying on this police
power justification, the Court upheld a broad range of state interests as
legitimate for Fifth Amendment takings purposes. 4
Despite the relatively lenient standard, the Court recognized that
state police power was not unbounded and frequently referred to Justice
Holmes's opinion in Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon.35 In that case,
Justice Holmes declared, "[W]hile property may be regulated to a cer-
tain extent, if regulation goes too far it will be recognized as a taking.
36
This limitation, deriving from the Constitution's Fifth Amendment,
attempts to ensure that valid state objectives are not met via unconstitu-
tional deprivations of property. In short, the limitation is geared to pre-
vent private land from being pressed into public use without the
requisite just compensation. 7
Unfortunately, prior decisions failed to demarcate the precise points
at which regulation is deemed to have gone "too far."'38 In an effort to
draw a line as to when a regulation has gone too far, the Court noted, in
strong dicta,39 that a regulation violates the Fifth Amendment if it
"denies an owner economically viable use of his land."4 This language
appeared in many Supreme Court takings decisions but had never been
relied on as the sole basis in finding a taking of property. As a result,
takings law remained unpredictable throughout the 1980's, a period of
considerable takings litigation.42
33. Richard A. Epstein, Ruminations on Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council: An
Introduction to Amicus Curiae Brief, 25 Loy. L.A. L. REV. 1225 (1992).
34. Nollan v. California Coastal Comm'n, 483 U.S. 825, 834-35 (1987). See also Miller v.
Shoene, 276 U.S. 272 (1928) (upholding a state order that forced the owner to destroy cedar trees
in order to protect nearby apple orchards); Hadacheck v. Sebastian, 239 U.S. 394 (1915)
(upholding a law prohibiting the continued use of a brickyard); Mugler v. Kansas, 123 U.S. 623
(1887) (upholding a law prohibiting the manufacture of alcoholic beverages).
35. 260 U.S. 393 (1922).
36. Id. at 415.
37. Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council, 112 S. Ct. 2886, 2895 (1992) (stating that one
risk involved with regulation is "that private property is being pressed into some form of public
service under the guise of mitigating serious public harm").
38. Id. at 2893.
39. Id. at 2918 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
40. E.g., Agins v. Tiburon, 447 U.S. 255, 260 (1980).
41. Lucas, 112 S. Ct. at 2918-19 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
42. In that decade, the Court decided several important takings cases, including, Agins v.
Tiburon, 447 U.S. 255 (1980), Hodel v. Virginia Surface Mining & Reclamation Ass'n, Inc., 452
U.S. 264 (1981), San Diego Gas & Elec. Co. v. City of San Diego, 450 U.S. 621 (1981), First
English Evangelical Lutheran Church of Glendale v. County of Los Angeles, 482 U.S. 304 (1987),
Nollan v. California Coastal Comm'n, 483 U.S. 825 (1987), and Keystone Bituminous Coal
Ass'n. v. DeBenedictis, 480 U.S. 470 (1987).
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In the Court's words, it has "been unable to develop any 'set
formula' for determining when 'justice and fairness' require that eco-
nomic injuries caused by public action be compensated by the govern-
ment," rather than be absorbed by private landowners.43 Accordingly,
the Court did not rely on absolute "linedrawing" as suggested by its
constitutional constraint that regulation may not deprive a landowner of
all economically viable land uses.
Instead, the Court implemented a balancing test, referred to by
scholars as the "multi-factor"'  or "three-factor" 45 test. The Court
applied this test on an ad hoc basis to determine if a Fifth Amendment
violation occurred.46 The most notable aspect of this test is that under
its application, all relevant factors in a land-use conflict were consid-
ered. The economic impact to the landowner was only one of the rele-
vant factors, and certainly was not used as the determinative factor.
In Penn Central Transportation Co. v. City of New York,47 the
Supreme Court specifically enumerated the factors to be considered in
balancing the private and state interests at stake in a takings dispute. To
determine the relative effect of the regulation or statute on the private
interest, the Court examined the "economic impact of the regulation on
the [takings] claimant" and the "extent to which the regulation has inter-
fered with [the landowner's] distinct investment-backed expectations. '48
On the other side of the proverbial balance, the Court examined the
legitimacy and importance of the state's interest advanced by the regula-
tory measure as enumerated in the statute.49 Under this framework, a
landowner who suffered a near total loss in property value presented a
strong case against the factors balanced on the state's side. However,
the financial impact was never determinative of the result under the bal-
ancing test; the Court always considered the legitimacy of the state's
interest.
Furthermore, the Court imposed a deferential standard in reviewing
legislative decisions to regulate. 0 As would be expected, the benefit of
43. Penn Central Transp. Co. v. City of New York, 438 U.S. 104, 124 (1978). See also
Goldblatt v. Hempstead, 369 U.S. 590, 594 (1962).
44. Paul, supra note 25.
45. Flint B. Ogle, Comment, The Ongoing Struggle Between Private Property Rights and
Wetlands Regulation: Recent Developments and Proposed Solutions, 64 U. COLo. L. REv. 573,
578 (1993).
46. E.g., Penn Central, 438 U.S. at 124.
47. 438 U.S. 104 (1978).
48. Id. at 124.
49. Id.
50. Nollan v. California Coastal Comm'n, 483 U.S. 825, 843 (1987) (Brennan, J., dissenting)
("it is also by now commonplace that this Court's review of the rationality of a State's exercise of
its police power demands only that the State 'could rationally have decided' that the measure
adopted might achieve the State's objective.") (citing Minnesota v. Clover Leaf Creamery Co.,
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the doubt went to the state and the balancing test weighted heavily in its
favor.51  Accordingly, states enjoyed much latitude in regulating land
uses that might be harmful to the environment.
Professor Cass Sunstein asserts that in applying the rather lenient,
deferential standard, "the Court has held it sufficient if a legitimate pur-
pose can be hypothesized and there is a minimally plausible connection
between that purpose and the statute at issue. ' 52 The significant aspect
of this standard is that the Court never required the statute's effect to
precisely match its aims.53 So long as any legitimate purpose for the
statute existed, the Court held the legislative action valid.54 The logical
antecedent to such a liberal mandate was a broad conception of "state's
interest" and "police power."
A growing faction of the Supreme Court, comprised of the more
conservative justices, 55 grew dissatisfied with this deferential standard of
review and, in their eyes, the overly broad concept of state police power.
This faction of Justices attempted to change takings law, in part, by
reducing the expansive view that accepted the prohibition of all nui-
sance-like activity as within a state's inherent power.56 Nollan v. Cali-
449 U.S. 456, 466 (1981)); accord Nectow v. City of Cambridge, 277 U.S. 183, 188 (1928);
Gorieb v. Fox, 274 U.S. 603, 608 (1927); Village of Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co., 272 U.S. 365
(1926).
Six years after Penn Central, the Court displayed the same deferential attitude in Hawaii
Housing Auth. v. Midkiff. 467 U.S. 229 (1984). Writing for the Court, Justice O'Connor noted
that it is unnecessary for a zoning provision to actually accomplish its stated purpose, "the
[constitutional requirement] is satisfied if ... the ... [state] Legislature rationally could have
believed that the [Act] would promote its objective." Id. at 242 (citing Western & Sullivan Life
Ins. Co. v. State Bd. of Equalization, 451 U.S. 648, 671-72 (1981) (alteration in original)); see
also Personnel Adm'r of Mass. v. Feeney, 442 U.S. 256, 272 (1979) (arguing that the practical
effects of regulation are better left to the legislative branch since the democratic process will
rectify improvident decisions); Daniel A. Farber & Philip P. Frickey, The Jurisprudence of Public
Choice, 65 TEx. L. Rav. 873, 877-78 (1987) (arguing that deferring to judgments of state
legislatures is one of the constitutional strategies of the contemporary Supreme Court).
51. Since the Court's finding in favor of the takings claimant in Pennsylvania Coal Co. v.
Mahon, no Supreme Court takings decision had so severely limited the scope of a state's police
power as in Lucas. See Epstein, supra note 33, at 1225.
52. Cass R. Sunstein, Interest Groups in American Public Law, 38 STAN. L. Rav. 29, 52
(1985).
53. Nollan, 483 U.S. at 843 n.1 (citing Williamson v. Lee Optical of Okla., Inc., 348 U.S.
483, 487-88 (1955)).
54. Williamson, 348 U.S. at 487-88 ("It is enough that there is an evil at hand for correction,
and that it might be thought that the particular legislative measure was a rational way to correct
it.").
55. The Conservative voting block consisted of Chief Justice Rehnquist, and Justices Scalia,
O'Connor, and Powell. Justice White joined this faction in Nollan but voted with the liberals in
Keystone. In Lucas, the conservative voting block was joined by Justice White, as well as Justices
Kennedy and Thomas.
56. See Keystone Bituminous Coal Ass'n v. DeBenedictis, 480 U.S. 470, 513-14 (Rehnquist,
C.J., dissenting) (arguing that the existing standard is inadequate in placing workable boundaries
on state police power).
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fornia Coastal Commission demarcated a shift in power to this
conservative faction. The Nollan majority jumped at the opportunity to
implement their reductivist views of the limits to state police power; the
result was a gradual movement towards greater protection of private
property rights. 7 Accordingly, the outer bounds of state police power
drifted away from the polar limits to a more conservative midpoint.
In Nollan, the Court effectuated this change by manipulating the
standard of review applied in takings cases. The Court pronounced a
more stringent level of scrutiny to be used in analyzing such takings
cases. The Nollan standard requires a closer nexus between the enumer-
ated means and ends of a regulation. 8 It is no longer sufficient for some
hypothesized state objective to exist.
As a result, where once the Court required that a regulation merely
advance a legitimate state interest, it now requires the regulation to "sub-
stantially" advance the state's interest.5 9 This requirement places an
added burden on state legislatures since it requires more precision in
matching needs for land regulation with state policy implementations.
Due to this added pressure on state legislatures, private landowners
enjoy a previously unexperienced "added protection" of their property
rights.
In summation, under the pure form of the balancing test, the Court
always considered both the private and public interests at stake in a tak-
ings dispute. The Court never relied on one factor to the exclusion of
the others, but always gave the interests on either side of the balance the
chance to outweigh the others. As enumerated by the Court, "the ulti-
mate conclusion" of whether or not a taking occurred always required a
"weighing of both private and public interests. ' 60 Furthermore, under
the historical application of the balancing of interests test, the Court
spotlighted an expansive police power by implementing a highly defer-
ential standard of review. Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council enu-
merated a rule that focused solely on the takings claimant's "bundle of
rights. ' 61 In doing so, it virtually ignored the state's enumerated inter-
57. Dissenting in Nollan, Justice Brennan argued that "[t]he Court's insistence on a precise fit
between the forms of burden and condition on each individual parcel along the California coast"
would "hamper the ability" of the Coastal Commission to regulate in the spirit of the public good.
Nollan, 483 U.S. at 848. He labeled the Court's more stringent standard of review "unreasonably
demanding" and argued that such a modification of the previous standard "could hamper
innovative efforts to preserve an increasingly fragile national resource." Id. at 849.
58. Id. at 865 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
59. Id. at 835.
60. Agins v. Tiburon, 447 U.S. 255, 261 (1980) (unanimous decision) (emphasis added).
61. 112 S. Ct. 2886, 2922-23 (1992) (Stevens, J., dissenting) ("Neglected by the Court today
is the first, and in some ways, the most important factor in takings analysis: the character of the
regulatory action.").
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ests, a factor that had been crucial under the balancing test.
B. Categorical Disposition of Regulatory Takings Claims: Focusing
on the Private Rights at Stake
In Lucas, the Court enumerated two instances in which the balanc-
ing approach is rejected in favor of a categorical rule. The first occurs
when a property owner is forced to suffer a physical invasion of his
property. 2 Regardless of the extent of the invasion, the Court will find
that a Fifth Amendment taking of the burdened portion has occurred.63
In some instances, the invasion can be as minute as a cable wire' and
may even result in an increase to the property's value.65 Nevertheless,
there is a taking of property that requires the regulating state to pay just
compensation.
The second instance in which a takings claim is decided categori-
cally is when a "regulation denies all economically beneficial or produc-
tive use of land."'66 If a court finds that all practical and economically
viable uses of land are prohibited by a challenged regulation or statute, it
must categorically find a taking.67 The lone exception to such a finding
is when "background principles of nuisance and property law" would
prohibit the intended land uses.68 As a rationale for this exception, the
Court stated that such a severe limitation must inhere in the title itself; it
cannot be created by the legislature. The situation is treated as if the
contemplated land use was never within the landowner's "bundle of
rights" in the first place. This exception, due to its reliance on the com-
mon law of nuisance, has been commonly referred to as the "nuisance
exception" to regulatory takings.69 This exception is a far cry from the
more generous noxious use standard that allowed the prohibition of any-
thing that was nuisance-like.
The impact of the Lucas rule, and the extent to which it will apply,
are questionable. According to Justice Scalia, a finding of "no economi-
cally viable use" will only occur in "relatively rare" situations. 70 This
point might explain why the Court had never relied on that language,
alone, as the basis for a takings decision. It is certainly conceivable that
62. Id. at 2893.
63. Id.
64. Loretto v. Teleprompter Manhattan CATV Corp., 458 U.S. 419 (1982).
65. Id. at 452 & n.9 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
66. Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council, 112 S. Ct. 2886, 2893 (1992).
67. Id. at 2894 (quoting Agins v. Tiburon, 447 U.S. 255, 260 (1980)).
68. Id. at 2901-02.
69. Id. at 2920 (Stevens, J., dissenting); Paul, supra note 25, at 1093; Popeo & Kamenar,
supra note 25, at 1092.
70. Lucas, 112 S. Ct. at 2894.
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Lucas may only be applied in limited circumstances. 71 If this proves to
be true, the majority of cases would be decided under the former stan-
dards, a hybrid of Penn Central's balancing test and Nollan's heightened
scrutiny.
Despite the arguments that Lucas will only rarely apply, Justices
Harry Blackmun and John Paul Stevens argued that the categorical rule
will be extensively utilized in the post-Lucas era.7 2 If, in fact, the case
has a significant impact on future takings decisions and the categorical
rule becomes widely utilized by a majority of states, two aspects. of the
rule will substantially change the legal constructs underpinning takings
law. First, where past takings decisions deferred to the language and
intent of legislative judgments, Lucas mandates virtual ignorance of the
plain meaning and intent of a challenged regulatory measure.73 Second,
rather than focus on legislative judgments to advance state interests,
courts must now examine background nuisance and property law as it
relates to the "valueless" parcel.74
First, regarding the standard of review, the Court decided takings
cases for decades by maintaining strict judicial deference to state legisla-
tures. 75 In Nollan, a conservative majority held that tighter scrutiny was
required to evaluate the constitutionality of challenged state actions.76
Consequently, this correlated with less legislative influence in land-use
law and greater protection of private property rights. Under Nollan,
however, courts were still required to at least evaluate and balance the
state's interest in the regulation.
In Lucas, a more solid majority of conservatives 77 continued to
expand on the principles established in Nollan. The new position seems
rather extremist in consideration of the abundance of case precedent that
displayed the deferential standard. Under the newly pronounced takings
71. Paul, supra note 25, at 1093; The Supreme Court. 1991 Term-Leading Cases, supra note
24, at 270.
72. Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council, 112 S. Ct. 2886, 2904 (1992) (Blackmun, J.,
dissenting) ("My fear is that the Court's new policies will spread beyond the narrow confines of
the present case."); id. at 2920-21 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (arguing that the Court's rule can have
a sweeping effect); Payne, supra note 25, at 316 (arguing that Lucas does not have the feel of a
narrow doctrine); Popeo & Kamenar, supra note 25, at 1092 (arguing that Lucas may result in a
flood of new litigation).
73. Lucas, 112 S. Ct. at 2893.
74. Id. at 2901-02.
75. Id. at 2909 (Blackmun, J., dissenting); Nollan v. California Coastal Comm'n, 483 U.S.
825, 843 (Brennan, J., dissenting); id. at 865 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
76. Nollan, 483 U.S. 825.
77. The Nollan majority consisted of five justices while the Lucas majority consisted of six.
Although three justices left the bench prior to Lucas, two of the three new justices, Kennedy and
Thomas, voted in favor of David Lucas.
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rule, courts are not required to examine the legislature's intent at all. 7 8 If
a finding of "no economically viable use" is made, the only relevant
inquiries are into background nuisance and property law.
This aspect of Lucas drew sharp criticism from Justice Blackmun.
He placed considerable weight on the impact of stare decisis and the
former burdens placed on individuals that challenged the constitutional-
ity of state regulatory measures. He argued that prior cases all held that
courts must defer to legislative judgments unless the plaintiff overcomes
a "presumption of constitutionality. ' 79 Lucas deviates from this long-
established rule. At present, according to Justice Blackmun, "the State
has the burden to convince the courts that its legislative judgments are
correct. '8 0 Furthermore, so long as a regulatory measure purported to
prevent a public harm, the Court had found such a regulation valid.8 '
This aspect, as well, was solid legal precedent grounded in a long line of
takings decisions.
Justice Scalia responded to the arguments advanced by Justice
Blackmun. He characterized the former standard as too lenient and too
easy to circumvent. Justice Scalia suggested that requiring a statute to
merely "recite a harm-preventing justification" is insufficient to bound
state police power. 82 He stated that since a harm-preventing justification
"can be formulated in practically every case," the deferential standard
"amounts to a test of whether the legislature has a stupid staff. '83 The
Justice continued, "We think the Takings Clause requires courts to do
more than insist upon artful harm-preventing characterizations."84
Second, regarding the consideration of the State's interest involved
in a regulation, the Court provided the lone exception to the categorical
rule as a mechanism to prohibit certain land uses in accordance with
state police power.8 5 This exception is noticeably narrower than the
Mugler-type exception that only required prohibited activity to be nui-
sance-like. Lucas announces a narrow nuisance exception, an analysis
that was previously rejected by the Court as a touchstone in determining
the legitimacy of state police power.8 6 The narrow exception, however,
78. Lucas, 112 S. Ct. at 2893 (stating that when the categorical rule is implemented, there is
no "case-specific inquiry" into the legislative intent behind the statute).
79. Id. at 2909 (quoting O'Gorman & Young v. Hartford Fire Ins. Co., 282 U.S. 251, 257
(1931)).
80. Id.
81. Id. at 2910-12.
82. Id. at 2898 n.12.
83. Id.
84. Id.
85. Id. at 2900-02.
86. In Keystone, the dissent argued that a broad application of a nuisance exception (i.e.
requiring a statute to prevent "nuisance-like" activity) "would surely allow government much
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is the only remaining avenue by which a state can advance its interests
in regulating certain activity.
The significance of the nuisance exception is that courts look to
common law principles instead of legislative pronouncements.8 7 If a
court finds that all economically beneficial use of land has been prohib-
ited as a result of a "confiscatory" regulation,8 the limitation "must
inhere in the title itself, in the restrictions that background principles of
the State's law of property and nuisance already place upon land owner-
ship."'8 9 These principles, though well established, are often antiquated
and obscure. As a means of setting land-use policy, it seems inadequate
to have such a test to resolve a constitutional issue since it is now harder
to update the law than by simple legislation.
In its conclusion, the Court held that David Lucas was entitled to
compensation unless his development plans did not comport with
existing limitations placed upon his property under South Carolina nui-
sance and property law.90 If these uses were not part of his existing
"bundle of rights," it could not be said that the state "took" a property
interest from him.91 On remand, the South Carolina Supreme Court
must apply the state's version of nuisance law and examine the scope of
Lucas' property rights. If, as Justice Scalia expects, they are unable
to demonstrate a prior limitation, Lucas must be awarded just
compensation.92
Although the "nuisance exception" provides a mechanism for
implementing state policy, it noticeably cuts back on the broad police
greater authority" than has been recognized in the past. Keystone Bituminous Coal Ass'n v.
DeBenedictis, 480 U.S. 470, 513 (1987) (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting).
The Keystone majority, however, refused to impose a narrow nuisance exception in
regulatory takings cases. The majority specifically noted that in Miller v. Shoene, 276 U.S. 272
(1928), "the Court did not consider it necessary to weigh with nicety the question whether [the
trees at issue] constituted a nuisance according to common law." Keystone, 480 U.S. at 491
(interior quotations omitted).
87. Lucas, 112 S. Ct. at 2912 n.15 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
88. A regulation that "prohibit[s] all economically beneficial use of land." Id. at 2900.
89. Id.
90. Id. at 2901-02.
91. Id. at 2899, 2902.
92. Justice Scalia stated, "It seems unlikely that common-law principles would have
prevented the erection of any habitable or productive improvements on [Lucas's] land; they rarely
support prohibition of the 'essential use' of land." Id. at 2901 (citation omitted). See also Richard
A. Epstein, The Seven Deadly Sins of Takings Law: The Dissents in Lucas v. South Carolina
Coastal Council, 26 Loy. L.A. L. Rv. 955, 965 (1993) (arguing that common law principles
would not prohibit the construction on David Lucas' property).
Both Justice Scalia and Professor Epstein were correct. On remand of Lucas, the South
Carolina Supreme Court held that the limitations placed on Lucas' property did not inhere in the
title itself, and that nuisance or property law in the state do not prohibit development on his land.
Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council, 424 S.E.2d 484, 486 (S.C. 1992).
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power protected- under a Mugler analysis or Penn Central standard.
With little surprise, the nuisance exception to the categorical takings rule
has been sharply criticized as being impractical and unsound. 93
Due to the two substantial changes in the takings doctrine, abolition
of the deferential standard of review and a narrow nuisance/property
exception, the legislative power to regulate land-use has been drastically
reduced if regulation results in total losses of economically viable uses. 9 4
Courts applying Lucas will only examine the private interests and a
body of nuisance and property law that may be outdated. Accordingly,
Lucas favors private property interests at the expense of state regulatory
power. It follows, then, that environmental protection advocates or citi-
zen groups, who previously relied on state legislation to effectuate their
goals, have lost a powerful weapon.
The lone question that remains is: To what extent will Lucas
replace the balancing of interests test? The answer to this question
depends on how often courts find that distinct property units are left with
no economically viable use. Unfortunately, there is no answer to this
dilemma, nor an answer to how courts should define the property units
at issue.
C. The Unresolved Problem: Defining the Unit of Property
A major flaw in the Lucas analysis is the Court's failure to resolve
a pressing issue regarding the definition of property units. This flaw is
of extreme importance because the definition of the property unit acts as
a threshold in determining the applicability of Lucas' categorical rule.95
This is due to the fact that the requisite finding of no economically via-
ble use, Lucas' triggering mechanism, hinges upon such property defini-
tions.96 Therefore, as stated above, the relevant question to be asked in
analyzing a takings challenge is: what is the unit of property that the
claimant argues is left with no economically viable use? Once this ques-
tion is answered, the court can proceed to analyze the value of the land
unit as it exists subsequent to the enactment of a restrictive use regula-
tion or statute. Accordingly, upon this determination, courts will either
apply Lucas or a hybrid of the Penn Central and Nollan standards.
93. Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council, 112 S. Ct. 2886, 2903 (1992) (Kennedy, J.,
dissenting) (arguing that nuisance law should not be "the sole source of state authority to impose
severe restrictions"); id. at 2918, 2921 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (arguing that the nuisance
exception is too rigid, too narrow, and "freezes" state common law); Payne, supra note 25, at 317-
18 (arguing that nuisance law is too arcane to be useful).
94. Payne, supra note 25, at 318 (arguing that a literal application of the categorical rule
renders the statutory process essentially meaningless).
95. Lucas, 112 S. Ct. at 2913 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
96. Id.
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This problem of defining the unit of property at issue in a takings
challenge has continuously plagued the Supreme Court. As Justice
Scalia noted:
When, for example, a regulation requires a developer to leave 90% of
a rural tract in its natural state, it is unclear whether we would ana-
lyze the situation as one in which the owner has been deprived of all
economically beneficial use of the burdened portion of the tract, or as
one in which the owner has suffered a mere diminution of the tract as
a whole.
9 7
"[T]his uncertainty regarding the composition of the denominator in
[the] 'deprivation' fraction has produced inconsistent pronouncements
by the Court."98 The deprivation fraction is the way the Court views a
takings case. 99 The denominator of the fraction represents the total
value of the land unit at issue and "the numerator represents the value
after the regulation."' 00
The inconsistent pronouncements alluded to by Justice Scalia were
the decisions in Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon'01 and Keystone Bitu-
minous Coal Ass 'n v. DeBenedictis.102 In Mahon, the Court found that
the Kohler Act 10 3 effectuated a taking of land because it rendered the
mining of certain coal deposits commercially impractical."° Viewing
the seams of coal as a separate unit of property that had been "taken,"
the Mahon Court defined the mineral estate, standing alone, as the
denominator of the fraction. Upon this finding, the Court ignored the
surface estate, and any necessary correlation between it and the coal
deposits, for purposes of defining the affected property unit.
In Keystone, a similar regulation was challenged' 05 and found not
to effectuate a compensable taking. 10 6 The difference in results between
the two cases was the Keystone Court's definition of a broader property
denominator. In finding that the mineral estate was useless without the
surface estate, 10 7 and thus not sufficiently an independent parcel of land,
the Court held that the affected seams of coal did not represent a "sepa-
rate segment of property for takings law purposes."' 0 8 Accordingly, the
97. Id. at 2894 n.7.
98. Id.
99. Id.
100. Ballenger, supra note 24, at 935.
101. 260 U.S. 393 (1922).
102. 480 U.S. 470 (1987).
103. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 52, § 661 et seq. (1966).
104. Penn Coal, 260 U.S. at 414.
105. The statute at issue in Keystone was the Pennsylvania Bituminous Mine Subsidence and
Land Conservation Act, PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 52, § 1406.1 et seq. (Supp. 1986).
106. Keystone Bituminous Coal Ass'n v. DeBenedictis, 480 U.S. 470 (1987).
107. Id. at 502.
108. Id. at 499.
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determination of whether or not a taking occurred depended on the defi-
nition of the property unit.
In Lucas, the Court did not resolve this pressing issue. The Court
merely stated that the answer lies within state laws of property. 10 9 Each
state has its own principles of property, as well as its own statutory and
common law. Therefore, in the fifty different states, there may be incon-
sistent property definitions and different results under Fifth Amendment
scrutiny. Since the definition of the property unit is of crucial impor-
tance under this categorical rule, the application and viability of Lucas is
still uncertain. A determination in one state that a parcel of land is suffi-
ciently independent to stand alone may be different than a determination
in another state. In part, takings claimants will experience a "luck of the
draw." Some courts will recognize smaller segments of property while
others may only view property in its broadest terms, accepting entire
holdings or aggregates of property as distinct units.
If state courts recognize that smaller units of property are identifi-
able land units for takings law purposes, it is much easier for a takings
claimant to show that a taking has occurred. 110 When property is
viewed in a broader fashion, as in Penn Central and Keystone,III a court
will rarely find that the categorical rule applies since the court can
always find at least some existing economically viable use. The logic
behind such a proposition is quite simplistic and easily illustrated by the
following example.
Suppose that an individual owns a 100-acre parcel of land that he
would like to divide into ten-acre plots and develop ten homes, one on
each plot. A court's refusal to recognize each ten-acre parcel as a sepa-
rate property segment would destroy most chances of succeeding on the
merits of a takings claim. In theory, the owner would try to concep-
tually sever each ten-acre plot from the main body of land. If the court
refuses to acknowledge the severance, the main body of land must be
looked at as the denominator in a takings claim.
109. Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council, 112 S. Ct. 2886, 2894 n.7 (1992).
110. "The larger the denominator in the fraction, the less likely it is that the percentage of
value lost to regulation will approximate zero, thus resulting in a taking." Ballenger, supra note
24, at 935. It logically follows that the smaller the unit of property representing the denominator,
the more likely it is that a statute will render the residual value close to zero. The only way for the
fraction to ever reach zero, or sufficiently close thereto, is for the numerator, or residual value, to
equal or approximate zero. This signifies the "total deprivation" intended to be covered by Lucas.
111. In Penn Central, the Court refused to sever Penn Central's air rights from the entire city
block. Penn Central Transp. Co. v. City of New York, 438 U.S. 104, 130 (1978). This city block,
containing both under- and over-ground structures, represented the claimant's aggregate holdings.
In Keystone, the Court refused to recognize coal deposits as separate from the mining company's
aggregate holdings, including the surface and mining estates. Keystone Bituminous Coal Ass'n v.
DeBenedictis, 480 U.S. 470, 498-500 (1987).
1194 [Vol. 48:1179
Further suppose that a zoning ordinance is enacted that requires
fifty-acre zoning for land development and that land development is the
only profitable land use in the area. The ordinance prohibits the build-
ing of the homes on the ten-acre plots. If a court views each ten-acre
plot as severable from the main body or as an independent unit, each
ten-acre plot, in this over-simplified example, would be left valueless.
On the other hand, if a court refused to define each ten-acre plot as the
denominator for takings purposes, the court would focus on the entire
100-acre parcel as the land unit. Therefore, under this analysis, the
court must conclude that two homes could be built, one on each fifty-
acre parcel.
When viewed in this broad sense, the unit of property still has an
economically viable use and has not been "taken." Although the land-
owner could not maximize his profits, as he would by building the
desired ten homes, he could earn a reasonable return on his investment.
Accordingly, at'least in states that view an owner's aggregate holding or
total interest in adjacent land parcels as the denominator of the property
unit, Lucas will seldom apply.' 1 2
In short, the Court's failure to resolve this seemingly critical issue
leaves many questions unanswered regarding the significance of the
decision. Although Justice Scalia argued that the categorical rule will
only apply in relatively rare situations, the concerns expressed by Jus-
tices Blackmun and Stevens are certainly realistic. In the post-Lucas
period, landowners will attempt to show that smaller segments of prop-
erty should be treated as distinct units of property. If courts accept these
arguments and analyze a takings claim in relation to this smaller unit, it
is much more likely that Lucas will have a significant impact.
This Note proceeds under the presumption that Lucas will have a
drastic impact on future takings cases and that the decision may have
sounded the deathknell for the balancing of interests test. This presump-
tion is based on the fact that recent Supreme Court decisions are moving
in the direction of enhanced protection of private land interests. This
power necessarily comes at the state's expense. The remainder of this
Note analyzes the position of environmental advocates after Lucas. The
Note highlights the ways in which the balancing of interests test will be
utilized most often. The balancing test is more equitable since it consid-
ers all relevant factors, including the protection of our nation's long-
range environmental interests. The following analysis features discus-
112. See Gardner v. New Jersey Pinelands Comm'n, 593 A.2d 251 (N.J. 1991) (holding that a
217-acre farm is not divisible into independent units of ten-acre farmettes for takings law
purposes).
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sions of interest group litigation, state nuisance law, and transferable
development rights ("TDRs").
III. ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION THROUGH LAND REGULATION:
ANALYZING COST-BENEFIT FACTORS
The development of the modem takings doctrine encompassed the
decision of important issues regarding alleged harmful land uses and
property value destruction. Regulatory measures challenged under the
Fifth Amendment purported to achieve certain goals, most importantly,
curtailing both current and future harms to society. Some cases demon-
strated that when states seek to prevent current harms with immediate
manifestations, it is relatively easy to identify the imminent danger
involved with the contemplated land use.11 Regulating land to prevent
future danger, or harm that manifests itself at some future date, presents
a trickier situation. In such instances, it is more difficult to identify a
general pattern in the substantive goals of regulatory plans. 114 Most stat-
utes or regulations that seek to protect our nation's environment fall
within this second category of cases. In regard to environmental con-
cerns, the danger may be imminent, but the manifestations of the danger
may not show for some time.
A fundamental principle in the United States is that legislative
authority and action is the primary "framework" for environmental pro-
tection."15 Legislative decisions to enact environmental protection plans
are not easy since "[t]here is a constant tension between economic activ-
ity and environmental purity." 116 Legislators must engage in analyses of
the costs and benefits involved in the regulatory plan. Accordingly, a
"self-evident, but most important proposition" is that "[t]he perennial
determination in environmental policy is whether the social costs of a
particular regulatory action are worth the benefits received."1 17 As Jus-
tice Scalia stated in a recent essay for the Houston Law Review, "[C]ost
113. See, e.g., Miller v. Shoene, 276 U.S. 272 (1928) (challenged ordinance sought to prevent
the imminent infection of nearby apple orchards).
114. See Nollan v. California Coastal Comm'n, 483 U.S. 825 (1987) (challenged regulation
sought to protect public access to the beach but did not seek to prevent an imminent harm to the
area); Agins v. Tiburon, 447 U.S. 255 (1980) (challenged regulation sought to prevent future
harms resulting from urban development); Penn Central Transp. Co. v. City of New York, 438
U.S. 104 (1978) (challenged Act sought to protect and preserve landmark sites in an attempt to
provide future benefits to the city).
115. Patricia M. Wald, The Role of the Judiciary in Environmental Protection, 19 ENv. AFF.
519 (1992).
116. F. Henry Habicht H, Responses to Justice Antonin Scalia, 24 Hous. L. REv. 111 (1987).
See also Antonin Scalia, Responsibilities of Regulatory Agencies Under Environmental Laws, 24
Hous. L. REv. 97, 101 (1987).
117. Habicht, supra note 116, at 111.
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benefit analysis is simply a weighing of all the desirable effects of a
proposed action against all the undesirable effects, whether or not they
are susceptible of being expressed in economic terms."'
18
In light of Lucas and the Act, several modifications must be made
by legislatures in considering the costs and benefits of newly proposed
measures. A fundamental consideration, in addition to the qualitative
factors regarding future societal benefits from land regulation, is the
economic consequences of environmental statutes. When Congress
passes environmental laws, they "simultaneously embody national goals
and rely on states to implement federal guidelines through the exercise
of state police powers."'1 9 Therefore, as Lucas apparently cuts back on
previously acceptable broad police power, legislatures cannot rely as
heavily on police power justifications for state-created responses to fed-
eral environmental protection laws.
For example, South Carolina's Act was a state response to a federal
environmental protection plan. Lucas demonstrates that the United
States Supreme Court is unwilling to accept that states can regulate in a
nearly confiscatory manner and justify such action with their inherent
police power. In the post-Lucas era, legislators must now add quantita-
tive economic costs in their analysis of qualitative costs and benefits for
environmental protection statutes. Some states must now contemplate
compensating landowners, such as South Carolina in regard to David
Lucas. Accordingly, there are definite and palpable economic costs for
environmental statutes that prohibit all economically viable land uses.
The quid pro quo for cutting back on broad police power and the
resulting economic costs is less legislative power and discretion in pro-
tecting our environment. There is one alternative, however, as enumer-
ated by Lucas' lone exception. States can still justify, under their police
powers, enforcement of federal environmental plans if the land uses pro-
hibited by the regulatory measure constitute a nuisance under the
existing law of the state. Accordingly, for those segments of our popula-
tion that advocate environmental protection, Lucas poses a tricky situa-
tion that requires some changes in strategy.
As a result, public interest groups or citizen groups that advocate
environmental protection must respond to Lucas by altering their old
118. Scalia, supra note 116, at 101. Cost-benefit analysis encompasses either quantitative or
qualitative factors. A quantative analysis of costs and benefits requires the determining entity to
select the alternative which can be implemented at the least cost per unit of benefit. See id. In
other instances, when decisions must be made on non-economic factors, quantification of costs
and benefits is less helpful. See id. One such instance is the legislative determination of whether
or not to enact legislation that provides future benefits to society at some cost that is immeasurable
in purely economic terms.
119. Wald, supra note 115, at 521.
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strategies. They must either utilize the nuisance exception to their
advantage or prevent courts from applying Lucas in the first place.
The remainder of this Note explores how environmental protection
or citizen groups can respond to Lucas in an effort to restore broad legis-
lative power in protecting our nation's resources. These citizen groups
can litigate claims that result in judicial decisions that prohibit, under
state property or nuisance law, land development in certain "target"
areas. These suits should try to duplicate the effects of broad-reaching
statutes intending to achieve the same. These groups can lobby state
legislatures for statutes that broaden state nuisance law. The easier it is
to show that a land use is a nuisance, the more likely the state can justify
its action through Lucas' exception. Finally, they can lobby for legisla-
tion that empowers administrative agencies to award transferable devel-
opment rights (TDRs) to landowners who are unable to develop their
own parcels due to a regulatory plan. TDRs will ensure that a land-
owner retains at least some economically viable use for his property. If
this occurs, subsequent takings claims filed by such landowners that are
still unsatisfied will be decided under a balancing test. That test is more
favorable to environmental groups since it considers both private and
public interests, and generally defers to the wisdom of the legislature.
IV. ENVIRONMENTAL INTEREST GROUPS AS LITIGATORS IN THE POST-
L Uc.4s ERA
Rather than simply lobby state legislatures for environmental stat-
utes that may be too costly as a result of Lucas, environmental interest
groups can play the role of litigator. At first glance, this solution seems
like a powerful, efficient method to combat Lucas and preserve broad
police power. As a primary goal, such groups must attempt to win law-
suits that would act in the spirit of legislation intended to achieve the
same results-mostly, preventing development in environmentally sen-
sitive areas.
Using the Lucas scenario as an example, a typical citizen suit
would seek an injunction against David Lucas under a nuisance theory.
In the alternative, a suit may be brought that seeks a declaratory judg-
ment that Lucas' intended land uses constitute a nuisance. Even if
Lucas succeeded in proving that he lost all economically viable uses for
his land, the state could still prohibit all development on his land since
his intended use was contrary to the state's nuisance law. In short, a
plain meaning of the Lucas exception is that state police power justifica-
tions can successfully defeat a takings claim where the intended land use
constitutes a nuisance. In a perfect world, citizen group suits would
operate well under this framework.
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Unfortunately, there are significant limitations on citizen groups
that attempt to litigate claims in the spirit of environmental protection.
First, a citizen group must overcome Article III standing requirements.
Second, citizen groups must overcome the costs of litigation and "free
rider" organizational difficulties. Finally, in regards to the type of suits
such groups could bring forth, nuisance claims or declaratory judgment
claims, there are practical difficulties in achieving the intended broad-
reaching results and further problems convincing courts to grant the
declaratory relief.
First, interest groups are likely to encounter problems with jus-
ticiability 20 since Article III of the Constitution limits federal courts to
deciding "cases and controversies" '12 1 between proper parties.122
Accordingly, in order to present a justiciable claim, interest group plain-
tiffs must allege the requisite standing requirements: injury-in-fact, cau-
sation, and redressability. 123
If an environmental group lacks standing, a court has no jurisdic-
tion to decide the case, regardless of its significance. Landmark cases
depict this inherent difficulty in interest group litigation. In Sierra Club
v. Morton,1 24 a public interest group was denied standing because it
could not specify any concrete injury-in-fact suffered by its members. 125
The Sierra Club, an environmental interest group seeking to protect
"the national parks, game refuges and forests of the country," 126 sued the
United States Forest Service to prohibit the construction of a ski resort
in a California mountain region. 127 The group alleged that the resort
120. In Flast v. Cohen, 392 U.S. 83 (1968), the Supreme Court elaborated on justiciability and
the concept of standing, regarding their uncertain scope and meaning. Id. at 95. The Court stated
that "no justiciable controversy is presented when the parties seek adjudication of only a political
question, when the parties are asking for an advisory opinion, when the question sought to be
adjudicated has been mooted by subsequent developments, and when there is no standing to
maintain the action." Id. (footnotes omitted). Furthermore, claims that are not ripe for judicial
review are not justiciable. Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council, 112 S. Ct. 2886, 2891
(1992).
121. Flast, 392 U.S. at 94.
122. Id. at 99-101.
123. Simon v. Eastern Ky. Welfare Rights Org., 426 U.S. 26, 40-46 (1976). Professor Steven
L. Winter argued that courts essentially analyze the merits of an ordinary tort case by focusing on
the injury-causation-redressability issues. Steven L. Winter, The Metaphor of Standing and the
Problem of Self-Governance, 40 STAN. L. REv. 1371, 1477 (1988). He concluded, "Standing law
and tort law share the same animating genes-that is, the same conceptual schema." Id. Because
under this format, courts are required to decide an issue that is essentially the merits of a tort case
on a record that is incompletely developed, the logical result of this "truncated process" is
"unsatisfactory opinions and bad decisions." Id. at 1477-78.
124. 405 U.S. 727 (1972).
125. Id. at 731, 741 (affirming the Ninth Circuit's decision that the Sierra Club did not make
the requisite allegation of direct injury to any of its members).
126. Id. at 730.
127. Id.
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would adversely affect the aesthetics and ecology of the area. 121
Despite the important public interest advanced by the Sierra Club,
the Court found that the plaintiffs lacked standing. The Court ruled as
such because it imposed a strict injury-in-fact requirement.1 29 As indi-
cated by this result, standing requirements drastically limit the ability of
citizen groups to bring actions on behalf of the public's best interests,
interests in the short and long-run implications of our activities.
Professor Winter, in a recent, well-acclaimed article, argued that
the standing doctrine is more a creation of Justices Brandeis and Frank-
furter and less of an historical formulation of law.130 Furthermore, he
concluded that modem concepts of standing have "disordering effects on
our legal analysis which produce bad decisions on the merits." '' Win-
ter argued that individuals acting for the good of the whole, or commu-
nity, should not be deprived of their ability to do so. 132 Accordingly,
Winter advocates a more flexible standing doctrine that would mandate
judicial determination of important public issues, such as those in envi-
ronmental cases. 133 Valid claims seeking to advance a legitimate public
purpose should be allowed to proceed on the merits. One such mecha-
nism to allow cases to proceed is liberalizing the injury-in-fact require-
ment through congressional grants of standing to sue.134 This flexibility
is achieved by more advanced concepts of injury. These conceptions
must focus on present injury with future manifestations, not just present
injury with immediate manifestations.
In one instance, the Court appeared to adopt a more flexible
128. Id. at 734.
129. The Court recognized that aesthetic and environmental well-being are interests "deserving
of legal protection through the judicial process," but "the 'injury in fact' test requires more than an
injury to a cognizable interest." Id. at 734-35. A less stringent approach would result in judicial
grants of standing so long as a legitimate interest would be injured. The focus would be more on
the interests at stake and less on the parties. See Winter, supra note 123, at 1470 (" 'Standing' is
and can only be a question about the legal rights at stake."). Cases decided under this approach
must still meet the minimum requirements set forth in Flast v. Cohen in that the dispute must be
"presented in an adversary context and in a form historically viewed as capable of judicial
resolution." 392 U.S. 83, 101 (1968).
130. Winter, supra note 123, Parts IV, V.
131. Id. at 1459.
132. Professor Winter concluded, "No longer need we always stand alone, apart from one
another. Instead, we may stand up for one another; we may stand by each other." Id. at 1515.
133. Id. at 1491.
134. The Supreme Court divided the standing doctrine into two branches, "prudential
limitations of standing" and "the constitutional 'core' of standing." Antonin Scalia, The Doctrine
of Standing as an Essential Element of the Separation of Powers, 17 SUFFOLK U. L. REV. 881, 885
(1983). In regard to the first branch, Congress or the Court can broaden or restrict findings of
standing. In relation to the constitutional "core" of standing, all parties, regardless of




approach in ruling on an interest group standing issue. In United States
v. Students Challenging Regulatory Agency Procedures (SCRAP),1 35 the
Court found that an interest group had standing to sue although the
plaintiff's claim appeared strikingly similar, in terms of harm alleged, to
that of the Sierra Club. 136 In SCRAP, a group of law students brought
suit because the Interstate Commerce Commission ("ICC") failed to pre-
pare an environmental impact statement before allowing the continua-
tion of a surcharge on railroad freight rates.' 37  Since the surcharge
would lead to an increased consumption of natural resources, some of
which would come from the Washington, D.C. area,'13 the Court found
that the students who used the forests, streams, and mountains in the
area would be injured by the adverse impact to the environment. 39
Therefore, the Court concluded that the plaintiff interest group had
alleged a concrete injury-in-fact and had standing to bring its claim.
Although the alleged injury to society in SCRAP was similar to that
claimed in Sierra Club, only the former met the technical requirements
of the standing doctrine. Accordingly, it appears that the injury-in-fact
requirement was applied more liberally in SCRAP, possibly due to the
Court's "willingness to discern breathlessly broad congressional grants
of standing."' 40 Environmental interest groups must rely on the Court's
treatment in SCRAP to overcome this inherent limitation on an interest
group's ability to litigate claims.' 4 1 Some states may attempt to liber-
135. 412 U.S. 669 (1973).
136. Id. at 678. The SCRAP Court, however, apparently perceived the two complaints as "very
different." Id. at 688. The Court focused on the tangible injury suffered by the members and its
nexus to the complaint. In contrast, the Sierra Club presented a claim that focused on harm to the
environment. Such harm is more attenuated to defined individuals than that alleged in SCRAP.
Accordingly, consistent with the principles behind the standing doctrine, the Court denied
standing to the Sierra Club and refused to allow it to bring a suit that was essentially on behalf of
the public in general.
The SCRAP Court pinpointed the difference between the two cases as the ability for the
SCRAP plaintiffs to identify "perceptible harm" that distinguished them from the public in
general. Id. at 689. The Court ultimately found that SCRAP had standing to sue based on their
properly plead complaint that identified their members that used the natural resources in question,
rather than just identifying use of the environment in general.
137. Id. at 678-79.
138. Id. at 678.
139. Id. at 683-90.
140. Scalia, supra note 134, at 898.
141. Justice Scalia suggested that the Court's adherence to the principles established in SCRAP
will not endure. Id. Viewing the standing conundrum in this context, there is an obvious tension
between the Scalia approach and the Winter approach. Where Justice Scalia contemplates judicial
limitation on broad congressional intentions to grant standing, Professor Winter advocates a
system that is more flexible. Winter concludes that a system of adjudication that recognizes both
private and public rights "provides one legal mechanism through which we can seek and attempt
to maintain a sense both that we are individuals and that what happens to varied communities
upon which we depend matters very much to each of us." Winter, supra note 123, at 1515.
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alize standing requirements by passing statutes that grant standing to
members of the general public, to sue on the public's behalf.
Second, even if an environmental group can present a justiciable
claim, there is another major hurdle standing in its way. There is no
guarantee that the group will have the financial capacity to proceed
through the costly litigation process. 142 Interest groups have trouble
with "free rider" problems as well as difficulties in meeting organiza-
tional costs. "The free rider problem refers to the issue of why an indi-
vidual should join the group ... if he cannot be excluded from the
benefits" that the group obtains. 143 Accordingly, since "free riders" pro-
vide no contribution to an organization's funds, the costs involved with
formulating a campaign are sometimes unobtainable. Professors Daniel
Farber and Philip Frickey, two leaders in the field of public choice the-
ory, argued that due to "free rider" problems, it is nearly impossible to
organize very large groups of individuals.'" Stated another way, the
entire country benefits from better environmental quality. Therefore, it
is a "public good" because it "is enjoyed in equal amounts by everyone
in society."' 4  When confronted with an opportunity to expend their
private resources for environmental causes, most individuals opt against
the choice to contribute organizational funds and seek a "free ride" on
the shoulders of contributing group members.
The rising costs of litigation and a lack of necessary funding may
render this option for environmental groups impractical. As our nation's
economy continues to struggle, financial contributions to interest groups
is sure to wane. Economic considerations are of vital importance to any
plaintiff groups seeking to play the litigator role.
Third, even if citizen groups overcome organizational and litigation
costs, there is a major problem in deciding whom to sue and under what
claim of right. Most environmental citizen suits are brought directly
under existing state or federal statutes.146 In order to nullify the effects
Accordingly, flexibility in standing principles enables environmental groups to advance important
"public rights" that positively influence our communities.
Unfortunately, a recent case that focused on environmental group standing may have sounded
a strong victory for the Scalia approach. See Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 112 S. Ct. 2130
(1992) (plurality opinion). Regarding Lujan, however, it has been argued that due to its "multiple
opinions and multiple lines of reasoning ... it is impossible to predict with confidence the scope
and effect of the holding." Richard J. Pierce, Jr., Comment, Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife:
Standing as a Judicially Imposed Limit on Legislative Power, 42 DUKE L.J. 1170, 1188 (1993).
142. See Wald, supra note 115, at 526.
143. Robert D. Tollison, Public Choice and Legislation, 74 VA. L. REV. 339, 342 n.18 (1988).
144. Farber & Frickey, supra note 50, at 892.
145. JOSEPH J. SENECA & MICHAEL K. TAUSlG, ENvIRoNMENTAL EcoNoNcs 86 (3d ed. 1984).
146. See, e.g., Friends of the Earth v. Weinberger, 562 F. Supp. 265 (D. D.C. 1983) (interest
group suit brought under National Environmental Protection Act); United States v. Metropolitan
Dist. Comm'n, 679 F. Supp. 1154 (D. Mass. 1988) (interest group suit brought under Federal
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of Lucas, citizen suits must attempt to identify certain land uses as nui-
sances. Such suits, however, would normally not have an underlying
stautory claim. Despite this fact, if these suits are successful, they
would open the door for broad-reaching environmental statutes that
would prohibit these activities that are predetermined as nuisances.
With this goal in mind, there are two weapons that are useful in
these citizen suits. First, injunctive relief in accordance with suits
brought under nuisance law. Second, declaratory relief in accordance
with suits seeking declarations that certain land uses are nuisances.
Environmental groups can try to bring nuisance actions against
landowners that are contemplating development projects in environmen-
tally sensitive "target" areas. In Sierra Club v. Block,'47 an environmen-
tal interest group sought, and obtained, a preliminary injunction
preventing the cutting of timber in five Texas wilderness areas. The
court granted Sierra Club's request for an injunction because it deter-
mined that the interest groups would likely succeed on the merits of a
claim brought under the National Environmental Policy Act. 148
In the hypothetical nuisance claims contemplated as responses to
Lucas, there would be no such underlying claim based on a federal regu-
lation. Therefore, the only way to bring the nuisance suit an obtain an
injunction would be to wait until a development project was underway.
If, in fact, a citizen suit successfully prevented a landowner from build-
ing, there would be little precedential value in the decision. Therefore,
the decision would only secure narrow positive effects. In order to
achieve a widespread result, the citizen group must sue each and every
landowner that is seeking to develop within the target area. Each nui-
sance claim must be litigated fully, and independently, because each nui-
sance case rests on the particular facts at issue.' 49
In conclusion, seeking a string of injunctions to prevent develop-
ment in the target area is not a realistic option to achieve long-term
success with widespread results. This "piecemeal" approach would be
too costly for citizen groups to implement, and a more broad-reaching
solution should be found.
One mechanism to achieve broad-reaching positive results is to
Water Pollution Control Act); Massachusetts Pub. Interest Research Group v. ICI Americas Inc.,
777 F. Supp. 1032 (D. Mass. 1991) (interest group suit brought under provisions of the Clean
Water Act); New York Pub. Interest Research Group, Inc. v. Limco Mfg. Corp., 697 F. Supp. 608
(E.D.N.Y. 1987) (interest group suit brought under Federal Water Pollution Control Act).
147. 614 F. Supp. 134 (E.D. Tex. 1985).
148. Id. at 135.
149. Town of Preble v. Song Mountain, Inc., 308 N.Y.S.2d 1001, 1010 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1970);
Reid v. Brodsky, 156 A.2d 334, 338 (Pa. 1959); Shields v. Wondries, 316 P.2d 9, 13 (Cal. Dist.
Ct. App. 1957).
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utilize declaratory judgment suits to prevent development in the entire
target area. Rather than sue individual landowners, citizen groups
should sue all landowners that have property within the target area. The
suit would be a form of reverse class action, with the defendants com-
prising the class. Such an approach would produce advantages on both
sides of the dispute.
First, the citizen group would have an easier time presenting a ripe
claim. Chances are, at any given time, there would be at least one land-
owner in the class contemplating a development project within the target
area. So long as at least one landowner within the class is sufficiently
close to beginning a project, the clam would be ripe for adjudication.15 0
Second, a further advantage is secured by the citizen group since
the first suit brought before the court would have a broader reaching
collateral estoppel effect against other class members.1 5 1 This, in turn,
produces a more cost-efficient method of bringing suits, to both the
plaintiff and defendant class.1 52 For the citizen group, it is much less
costly to bring one suit as opposed to many. For the defendant class, it
is more cost efficient for litigation costs to be spread among all the class
members rather than be borne solely by each individual member.
In order to successfully obtain declaratory relief, the citizen group
must first satisfy Article III's justiciability requirements. 153 In the situa-
tion contemplated above, a defendant class action against landowners in
a target area, the two primary limitations would be standing and
ripeness.
Some declaratory judgment suits present larger problems with
standing than others. In one type of declaratory judgment suit, a party
that anticipates being haled into court in a traditional coercive lawsuit
seeks declaratory relief so that the court can declare the respective rights
of the parties.154 In such a case, there is little doubt that the parties
would have standing since they are actually defendants in a coercive suit
that has yet to be filed.
In the case of the citizen suits, there is no such coercive lawsuit in
which the group would be named as a defendant. 55 Therefore, such
suits present complex standing issues, not unlike the issues contem-
150. See 26 C.J.5. Declaratory Judgments § 28 (1956).
151. Note, Defendant Class Actions, 91 HARv. L. REv. 630 (1978).
152. Id.
153. Collin County v. Homeowners Ass'n (Haven), 915 F.2d 167, 170-71 (5th Cir. 1990).
154. E.g., id. at 172; Kansas City Power & Light Co. v. Kansas Gas & Elec. Co., 747 F. Supp.
567, 572 (W.D. Mo. 1990).
155. In the environmental cases, any coerciveness must be on the part of the interest group
because members of the general public would have little to gain by suing such a group.
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plated in the earlier discussion of interest group standing.156 Regarding
standing and the declaratory judgment suit, courts should focus on the
principles enumerated by Professor Winter and return to the "public
rights" model of standing to broaden conceptions of injury-in-fact. 157
Courts should recognize a more liberal concept of injury-in-fact,
one that is more suitable in dealing with complex environmental issues.
Primarily, courts should accept, for injury-in-fact purposes, present inju-
ries that have future manifestations. In environmental issues, such
future manifestations of injury are part of the standard scenario. Injuries
to our environment that occur today are sufficiently concrete regardless
of whether the manifestations are apparent today or at some time in the
future. By adopting this approach, courts will accept that damage to the
environment, even if not presently manifesting itself, is still a present
injury, cognizeable for injury-in-fact purposes. Therefore, under a
SCRAP or Winter model of liberal, environment-conscious standing,
interest groups can bring these declaratory judgment suits that seek to
prevent current harm with future manifestations.
In addition to standing problems, citizen groups that seek declara-
tory judgments may have ripeness problems as well. 158 At the time the
hypothetical suit would be brought by the citizen group, there must be at
least one landowner whose intentions to develop provide the basis for a
current case or controversy. The defendant class action concept, how-
ever, may limit the applicability of ripeness concerns if the class is broad
enough that the reviewing court is convinced that at least one land-
owner's intentions make the controversy ripe for review.
At some point, ripeness concerns and standing concerns intersect,
leaving the reviewing court with a dilemma as to whether at a certain
point in time, a controversy exists under which there is a present, cogni-
zable injury. Accordingly, the Article III dilemma may severely under-
mine an interest group's ability to use declaratory judgments to advance
broad-reaching environmental policy.
Another consideration regarding declaratory relief is a judicially
imposed constraint that such relief will not be issued unless certain
"basic principles" are satisfied.' 59 "The most important of these princi-
ples are the adversity of the interest of the parties, the conclusiveness of
the judicial judgment and the practical help, or utility of that judg-
ment." 60  Most significant to the contemplated citizen suits is the
156. See supra notes 120-141 and accompanying text.
157. For a discussion of the public rights model, see Winter, supra note 123, at 1394-1417.
158. See generally 26 C.J.S. Declaratory Judgments § 28 (1956).
159. See Step-Saver Data Sys., Inc. v. Wyse Technology, 912 F.2d 643, 647 (3d Cir. 1990).
160. Id.
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requirement that the issuance of the declaratory judgment would be
"conclusive to define and clarify the legal rights or relation of the par-
ties.' 16 1 One issue is the extent to which a declaratory judgment would
finalize any controversy surrounding intended land uses within the target
zone. If a landowner could still challenge a regulation enacted subse-
quent to the declaratory judgment action, the disposition of that takings
claim would symbolize the absolute finality of the dispute. With that in
mind, courts may feel awkward granting declaratory relief when it is
likely that affected landowners would still need judicial assistance in
deciphering the boundaries of their rights.
Finally, despite the presence of these basic principles, the final
decision to issue a declaratory judgment is within the discretion of the
trial court. 162 Under this standard, however, the trial court has broad
discretion to deny declaratory relief even if the basic principles are met.
This can also act to limit the effectiveness of such efforts taken by citi-
zen group litigators.
In conclusion, although interest group lawsuits have been success-
ful in some contexts in the past, they are probably not the best solution
to counteract Lucas. Accordingly, interest groups should focus their
attention on modifying their lobbying practices to either expand Lucas'
enumerated exception or to avoid the case entirely.
V. ENVIRONMENTAL GROUPS AS LOBBYISTS SEEKING MODIFICATION
OF STATE NUISANCE LAW
A second solution to the problem created by Lucas is for environ-
mental groups to continue, but modify, their lobbying practices. The
thrust of Lucas is essentially repelled if legislators statutorily alter the
relevant considerations in applying the exception to the categorical tak-
ings rule. Accordingly, the goal is to convince legislators to statutorily
alter nuisance law, enabling a state to more readily defend its regulatory
measures as valid exercises of nuisance-preventing police power. A
broader state nuisance doctrine affords legislators more discretion
regarding restrictive-use statutes. 163 If the procedural posture of a tak-
ings case reached the stage in which a court must determine the applica-
bility of the nuisance exception, an expansive nuisance statute would
provide a state with a winning argument that the intended land uses do
161. Id. at 648.
162. E.g., Telectronics Pacing Sys., Inc. v. Ventritex, Inc., 982 F.2d 1520, 1526 (Fed. Cir.
1992); Bankers Trust Co. v. Old Republic Ins. Co., 959 F.2d 677, 682 (7th Cir. 1992); ACLU
Found. of S. Cal. v. Barr, 952 F.2d 457, 466 (D.C. Cir. 1991); Minnesota Mining and Mfg. Co. v.
Norton Co., 929 F.2d 670, 672 (Fed. Cir. 1991); Presbyterian Church (U.S.A.) v. United States,
752 F. Supp. 1505, 1511 (D. Ariz. 1990).
163. See Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council, 112 S. Ct. 2886, 2901 (1992).
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not inhere within the landowner's title. As mandated by Lucas, the
state's argument will succeed because the restrictions placed upon the
land parcel existed prior to the challenged legislation. 1 4
Some states have enacted broad nuisance statutes to supplement
their common law. Each state used slightly different language in defin-
ing "nuisance." In Louisiana, a landowner cannot engage in activity on
his property "which may deprive his neighbor of the liberty of enjoying
his own [property], or which may be the cause of any damage to
him."'' 65 Alabama has a somewhat broader concept of nuisance, and
defines it as "anything that works hurt, inconvenience or damage to
another." 166 The Alabama statute sets forth a reasonable person test in
evaluating whether or not something causes an inconvenience to the
neighboring landowner.1 67 The state of Washington enacted two provi-
sions that establish causes of action for nuisance.' 68 California also uses
nuisance statutes to maintain broad conceptions of nuisance. That stat-
ute provides that "[a]nything which is injurious to health, or is indecent
or offensive to the senses, or an obstruction to the free use of property,
so as to interfere with the comfortable enjoyment of life or property...
is a nuisance.' 6 9 Other states, such as Texas and New York, have rec-
ognized that state legislatures have the power to alter the common law of
nuisance through statutory creations.' 70
As a general rule, these states have all recognized that legislation
can only define as nuisance that which is, in fact, a nuisance.' 7 ' At least
in New York, the "power of the legislature to enlarge the category of
public nuisances is not limited to those known at common law."' 72
Statutes that broaden nuisance law will help nullify the effects of
Lucas' pro-plaintiff rule by broadening its exception. The result would
be a renewed opportunity for environmental groups to promote the good
164. The merit of this argument depends, in part, on how literally Justice Scalia meant for this
opinion to be read and how literally it was to be applied. Under a strict reading, Lucas requires
that proposed restrictions adhere in the principles that nuisance law "already place upon land
ownership." Id. at 2900. Legislation avoids Lucas if passed in two steps. The first step can adjust
nuisance or property law, putting in place the restrictions according to state law. The second step
would then regulate the land by prohibiting certain uses within the bounds of the statutes passed in
the first step.
165. LA. CIv. CODE ANN. art. 667 (West 1980).
166. ALA. CODE § 6-5-120 (1993).
167. Id.
168. WASH REV. CODE ANN. § 7.48.010, and § 7.48.120 (West 1992).
169. CAL. CIVIL CODE § 3479 (West 1970).
170. See 81 N.Y. JuR. 2d Nuisances § 9 (1989); 54 TEX. JuR. 3d Nuisances § 8 (1987).
171. See, e.g., Ace Tire Co. v. Municipal Officers of Waterville, 302 A.2d 90, 98 (Me. 1973);
Biber v. O'Brien, 32 P. 425, 427 (Cal. Dist. Ct. App. 1934). See also 47 CAL. JUR. 3d Nuisances
§ 4 (1979); 54 TEX. JUR. 3d Nuisances § 8 (1987).
172. 81 N.Y. JuR. 2d Nuisances § 9 (1989).
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of society by advancing land development control and protection in
environmentally sensitive areas.
Unfortunately, although the Lucas majority did not specify that
state legislation could not manipulate takings law as such, there is a
strong argument against the previously enumerated suggestion. Justice
Stevens argued in dissent that Lucas effectively "freezes" the common
law.1 73 He interpreted the majority opinion as mandating a constant
application of nuisance and property law that cannot be altered with
changing societal circumstances. 174 Accordingly, under this view, nui-
sance and property law must remain static-unable to be changed
through statutory creations.
Recent Supreme Court decisions, however, reflect that as society
changes, the law must change as well.175 Under this rationale, it would
be imprudent to analyze takings cases in relation to ancient law that was
formulated on circumstances which have long since changed. New laws
must reflect new societal problems brought forth by changed circum-
stances, technology, and environmental problems. For example, as our
comprehension of environmental damage increases, state nuisance laws
must appereciate the characteristics of such damage. One such charac-
teristic that should be reflected in newly enacted statutes is that present
nuisances exist when harm is apparent, though not manifesting itself for
some time. This will ensure that nuisance law encompasses all activities
that rightly fall within the purposes behind such a doctrine.
Furthermore, state nuisance law is ill-suited as a touchstone in
deciding complex land-use matters unless there is a device that will
ensure fair applications of the doctrine as society's needs change. In
Park Center Inc. v. Champion International Corp.,176 a federal district
court stated that it was necessary to construe an Alabama nuisance stat-
ute broadly to effect the statute's purpose-nuisance law that evolves
with changed circumstances. 177  Other courts need to follow this
approach as well, deferring to nuisance statutes and interpreting them as
broadly as possible.
It is essential for courts to maintain a flexible approach to nuisance
173. Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council, 112 S. Ct. 2886, 2921 (1992).
174. Id. at 2921-22, 2922 n.5.
175. As Justice Stevens argued in dissent, "We live in a world in which changes in the
economy and the environment occur with increasing frequency and importance. If it was wise a
century ago to allow Government 'the largest legislative discretion' to deal with 'the special
exigencies of the moment,' it is imperative to do so today." Id. at 2922 (citation omitted).
Professor Sax noted, however, that "[the tone and rhetoric of Lucas seems deliberately
calculated to cut off arguments that changing times create changing needs." Sax, supra note 23, at
945.
176. 804 F. Supp. 294 (S.D. Ala. 1992).
177. Id. at 302.
1208 [Vol. 48:1179
law since it has long been a difficult area to define and apply. One court
called nuisance law "the great grab bag, the dust bin, of the law.
178
Needless to say, " 'nuisance' is a term which does not have a fixed con-
tent either at common law or at the present time.
17 9
In People v. Lim,180 the California Supreme Court addressed the
difficulties involved with nuisance law. The court concluded, "In a field
where the meaning of terms is so vague and uncertain it is a proper
function of the legislature to define those breaches of public policy
which are to be considered public nuisances within the control of
equity. 181
Considering these dynamics of nuisance law, and those stated in
Lucas, states must be allowed to update nuisance law as they see fit.
Even though a land use was not a nuisance yesterday, it does not neces-
sarily follow that it is not a nuisance today. In light of today's knowl-
edge, the utilities and injuries of a given land use may be interpreted
differently than in the past. Accordingly, Lucas should not be inter-
preted as requiring a constant application of nuisance law. Instead, it
should be interpreted as requiring state statutes to specifically name the
evils that the statute is intending to cure. So long as the enumerated
means and ends of the statute are reasonable, courts should defer to their
language. If legislation updates nuisance law by establishing broad
parameters, as in Alabama and California, Lucas' exception will have
greater applicability. This, in turn, would give broad police powers to
state governments.
In conclusion, this solution to the problems confronting environ-
mental groups in the post-Lucas period will effectively expand the nui-
sance exception. Although this solution will work in jurisdictions that
desire broad nuisance law to enable comprehensive environmental pro-
tection, other jurisdictions may be reluctant to do so. Therefore, envi-
ronmental groups should not rely on this strategy as their sole
mechanism to nullify the impact of Lucas.
VI. ENVIRONMENTAL GROUPS AS LOBBYISTS SEEKING TDR PLANS
TO PRESERVE LANDOWNERS' ECONOMICALLY VIABLE USES
The final specific strategy is for environmental groups to lobby leg-
islators to enact statutes that provide for an administrative remedy. In
178. Awad v. McColgan, 98 N.W.2d 571, 573 (Mich. 1959). The court further stated that
nuisance "is so comprehensive a term, and its content is so heterogeneous, that it scarcely does
more than state a legal conclusion that for one or another of widely varying reasons the thing
stigmatized as a nuisance violates the rights of others." Id.
179. People v. Lim, 118 P.2d 472, 476 (Cal. 1941).
180. Id.
181. Id. at 476.
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accordance with this remedy, an administrative agency would be
empowered to develop a transfer of development rights ("TDR") pro-
gram to coincide with a regulatory scheme. Under such a program,
landowners will retain an economically viable use of their land in the
form of a marketable TDR.'82 Thus, Lucas' categorical rule will be
inapplicable since the requisite finding of "no economically viable use"
will be lacking. 1 3 Although there are pros and cons to the TDR plan,
the benefits should be sufficient to render this option the most practical
response to Lucas.
Under a TDR program, a landowner's right to develop is severed
from the remaining rights within the metaphorical bundle. l8 4 The right
to develop, although prohibited within the burdened tract that exists
inside a regulated area, can be sold to another developer who owns prop-
erty within an area designated to "receive" TDR's.18 5 Accordingly, a
burdened landowner retains some economic value of his tract despite a
prohibition on the development of his own land. This economic value
represents a return of value on any investment made by the landowner.
Sometimes this return will result in a profit, while other times, it may
result in a slight loss. Regardless, as far as the Supreme Court is con-
cerned, the land has definitely not lost all economic value.
Although all landowners assume a risk that subsequent social or
legal developments may decrease the value of their property, TDR pro-
grams provide for a form of compensation to burdened landowners.
Therefore, the disparity between burdened and unburdened landowners
is reduced. 186 As a result, TDR programs operate in the "spirit of fair
play" by ensuring that private land is not forced into public use without
ample opportunity for a return on the landowner's investment.187
Landowners that possess or have the oppportunity to acquire TDRs
are not prohibited from challenging regulations as unconstitutional tak-
ings of property.18 8 A court's analysis, however, would follow under a
182. See Fred F. French Investing Co. v. City of New York, 350 N.E.2d 381, 387 (1976);
Jerold S. Kayden, Market-Based Regulatory Approaches: A Comparative Discussion of
Environmental and Land Use Techniques in the United States, 19 B.C. ENwrL. AFF. L. REv. 565,
575 (1992) (arguing that in theory, TDRs permit landowners to recoup some of the value lost as a
result of development restrictions).
183. See Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council, 112 S. Ct. 2886, 2893 (1992).
184. Kayden, supra note 182, at 575.
185. Norman Marcus, Transferable Development Rights: A Current Appraisal, PRop. &
PROB., Mar.-Apr. 1987, at 40.
186. Id.
187. Id.
188. The Supreme Court fully understands that some people would prefer faster or less
expensive alternatives to the litigation process. In Commodity Futures Trading Commission v.
Schor, 478 U.S. 833 (1986), the Court held that a non-Article III tribunal could decide cases
involving alleged securities sales improprieties. On the facts in Schor, the Court determined that
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"balancing of interest" test rather than under a Lucas categorical
approach. One important consideration is that based on the Court's
pronouncements regarding TDRs, it is unlikely that marketable develop-
ment rights would be considered the equivalent of "just compensa-
tion."189 Accordingly, if TDR programs are used, landowners have the
best of both worlds. They maintain economically viable land uses, gen-
erally a sufficient return to avoid a costly litigation process. Also, they
can still challenge zoning regulations as unconstitutional takings in order
to receive just compensation for their land.
TDR programs are also useful to the state in advancing important
land-use policies. State and local governments can intervene in the mar-
keting of TDRs. States can acquire development rights from burdened
landowners and "bank them for resale to developing properties" in
receiving areas.' 90 Development banks are valuable because they help
to "insure rudimentary fairness in the allocation of economic bur-
dens." 191 This aspect of TDRs undermines one of the main criticisms of
development rights transfer programs.
The criticism focuses on the nature of the TDR market. As in all
markets, the buyers and sellers of TDRs integrate outside factors in
determining fair market value of such development rights. These factors
consist of the quality and quantity of density restrictions in "receiving"
areas, the quantity of landowners possessing TDRs, and the level of
administrative cost involved in TDR transactions. Once buyers and sell-
ers consider the marketplace in a broad sense, values can be attributed to
the chunks of floating rights transferred between parties.
In Fred F. French Investing Co. v. City of New York,192 the New
York Court of Appeals invalidated a TDR program based on certain
enumerated deficiencies in the TDR marketplace. Primarily, the court
focused on the uncertainty and instability in regard to the supply and
demand of marketable TDRs. 193 In simple terms, what good is a TDR if
nobody is willing to buy at a fair price? The French court concluded
by availing himself of the administrative remedy, the plaintiff "waived any right he may have
possessed to the fiill trial" of a related counterclaim before an Article Ill court. Id. at 849. The
Court rationalized that the administrative proceeding in Schor was constitutional because it did not
seek to misappropriate the "essential attributes of judicial power" from Article III courts. Id. at
851. Accordingly, in cases that require the determination of constitution claims, as in Fifth
Amendment takings claims, there is probably no effective waiver of one's right to an adjudication
before an Article III tribunal. See id. at 848 (stating the purposes behind Article III, section 1).
Therefore, landowners can seek faster remedies at the administrative level, and, if unsatisfied, can
proceed to file a claim in court.
189. Marcus, supra note 185, at 41.
190. Id.
191. Fred F. French Investing Co. v. City of New York, 350 N.E.2d 381, 389 (N.Y. 1976).
192. Id.
193. Id. at 387-89.
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that if there was no legitimate government purpose behind the chal-
lenged ordinance, the restriction and TDR program were invalid as vio-
lative of the burdened landowners' due process rights. 194 Courts that
follow the French approach may be reluctant to uphold TDR programs
unless the state becomes more involved by creating a TDR bank.
A second argument against TDR plans as a solution to Lucas is that
although state and local governments can continue to regulate certain
areas of land, other areas designated to receive TDRs are subject to
overdevelopment.19 5 This, in turn, could lead to problems when the ini-
tial regulation that creates the TDR program covers a vast area of land
and many different owners.
Furthermore, there are steep transaction costs involved in trading
TDRs. 196 Most notably, "TDR transactions involve time-consuming
negotiations over price, preparation of purchase and sale agreements and
other documents, and closings."' 97
In conclusion, TDR programs can work. Landowners can receive
valuable development rights that can be sold to the state or private par-
ties. If states regulate by adding TDR incentives, it will be easier to
incorporate broad environmental plans within the state's police power.
Reviewing courts would be forced to analyze a subsequent takings claim
under a balancing of interests test, instead of the Lucas test. The former
test is more favorable to states and fosters a broader conception of police
power. Environmental interest groups should place this solution to
Lucas ahead of the other suggestions. It is the most practical way to
respond to Lucas since it is an effective way to avoid litigation entirely.
VII. CONCLUSION
Prior to Lucas, courts decided takings cases by balancing the inter-
ests of the private landowner against those of the state. Under this bal-
ancing of interests test, courts applied a highly deferential standard of
review regarding legislative judgments. Accordingly, courts granted
wide latitude to state governments that enacted environmental protection
plans which adversely affected some property values.
Lucas' categorical takings rule focuses solely on the landowner's
interests and background principles of state nuisance and property law.
In applying this rule, courts do not inquire into the legitimacy of the
state's actions as enumerated in the challenged statutes. Therefore, leg-
islative decision-making is irrelevant under a strict application of Lucas.
194. Id. at 386-87.
195. Marcus, supra note 185, at 42.
196. Kayden, supra note 182, at 578.
197. Id.
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One important factor ignored in Lucas is the influence exerted by con-
cerned citizen groups over their elected representatives. This necessarily
makes it more difficult for environmental groups to help create legisla-
tion that is necessary to protect our environment.
Since our society's future depends on our ability to curtail the
destruction of our environment, it is advantageous to ensure that Lucas
is simply an isolated case resting on a narrow set of facts. To reach
these ends, environmental interest groups can restructure their efforts
and attempt to render the case inapplicable or expand its lone exception.
Such groups may achieve success litigating claims in court or lobbying
for legislation that broadens a state's conception of nuisance. Most
environmental groups will find more success, however, if they lobby for
legislation that provides for the issuance of TDRs to burdened landown-
ers. Transferable rights provide an economically viable use for land-
owners, despite restrictive-use ordinances or statutes.
If landowners retain at least some reasonable economically viable
use for their land, courts will be forced to rely on the balancing of inter-
ests test to decide takings cases. Because that test considers both sides
of a takings dispute, it obtains the normative goals of the Fifth Amend-
ment's Takings Clause: justice and fairness. 19 8 Lucas may have been a
just result given the facts of that case. However, future takings decisions
should consider all of the relevant factors, as dictated by the line of cases
that followed Penn Central. Under this approach, states will have the
necessary power to regulate our land in a fashion that protects our long-
term interests in our environment.
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